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Introduction	
	
According	 to	 the	 latest	 figures	 from	 the	 OECD1 :	 from	 all	 OECD	 countries	
Denmark	 came	 out	 on	 top	 with	 an	 accumulated	 pension	 savings	 representing	
199.0%	of	the	Danish	GDP.	The	Netherlands	came	second	with	an	accumulated	
pension	fund	savings	of	171%	of	GDP.	
	
Size	matters,	especially	the	changes	in	size	that	have	taken	place	over	time.	For	
instance	 in	 2007,	 the	 Assets	 Under	 Management	 (AUM)	 of	 all	 Dutch	 pension	
funds	 represented	 just	108.8%	of	 the	2007	Dutch	GDP	 level.	 Since	 then,	Dutch	
pension	fund	assets	have	grown	much	faster	than	GDP	levels.	Size	also	matters	
for	the	Dutch	government	debt	levels.	In	1995	it	reached	its	highest	level	of	the	
last	24	years	at	73.1%	of	GDP.	In	2009	the	level	stood	at	56.8%	and	by	2018	the	
level	was	52.4%.	Over	time,	Dutch	Finance	Ministers	have	managed	to	reduce	the	
borrowing	 levels;	 in	 other	 words	 taxes	 were	 used	 to	 repay	 outstanding	
government	debt	levels	relative	to	GDP	levels..		
	
The	52.4%	of	GDP	represents	€406	billion	in	Dutch	government	debt	for	2018.	
Compare	 this	 to	 the	 total	 savings	 in	 Dutch	 pension	 funds	 in	 2019	 of	 €	 1428	
billion	and	it	is	clear	that	all	pension	funds	together	could	potentially	only	invest	
28.4%	of	their	portfolio	in	Dutch	government	bonds.	Of	course,	this	is	unrealistic	
given	that	some	private	domestic	and	foreign	investors	might	wish	to	buy	some	
Dutch	government	bonds	as	well.	The	ECB	has	been	a	buyer	of	bank	bonds	since	
2015.	 	 Its	 Quantitative	 Easing	 program	 of	 €2.6	 trillion	 is	 spread	 over	 all	
Eurozone	 countries	 on	 basis	 of	 each	 country’s	 relative	 share	 in	 the	 Eurozone	
GDP.	 With	 the	 Dutch	 share	 of	 4.8%	 of	 the	 Eurozone	 GDP,	 such	 purchases	
amounted	to	€125	billion.	This	leaves	Dutch	pension	funds	with	a	much-reduced	
opportunity	to	buy	Dutch	bank	risks.	
	
The	 flaws	 in	 the	 Dutch	 pension	 system	 are	 linked	 with	 the	 government’s	
assessment	 of	 the	 adequacy	 of	 providing	 for	 future	 pension	 payouts.	 The	 law	
states	 that	 such	 assessment	 should	 be	made	 on	 basis	 of	 the	Ultimate	 Forward	
Rate,	which	 in	2015	was	 reduced	 to	3.3%.	Three	 factors	 are	 currently	 in	play:	
negative	 interest	 rates	 on	 government	 bonds;	 diminished	Dutch	 bank	 risks	 on	
offer	 due	 to	 ECB’s	 quantitative	 easing	 and	 thirdly	 the	 expected	 slow	 down	 in	
economic	growth,	which	is	already	manifesting	itself	in	the	sharp	drop	of	share	
prices	on	the	European	stock	markets.	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																																																																																
																																																								
1	http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/private-pensions/Pension-Funds-in-Figures-
2019.pdf	
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Chapter	 1:	 The	 macro	 economic	 overview	 of	 the	 Dutch	 pension	 market	
over	the	period	2007-2019	
	
	
The	 following	 variables	 are	 set	 out	 below:	 Year,	 Pension	 Assets	 Under	
Management	 (all	pension	 funds),	Netherlands	GDP,	Dutch	CPI	annual	 level	 and	
yield	on	10	year	Dutch	State	bonds.	
	
	
Year										AUM																							GDP																				Annual	CPI	change				Yield	10	year	
																			Euro	Billions				Euro	Billions																	%																						Dutch	Treasuries	
																																																																																																																									%	
	
2007									666.7																				613																									1.87																											4.27	
	
2008									655.5																				639																									1.95																											3.67	
	
2009									554.8																				617																										1.11																										3.45	
	
2010									699.9																				632																										1.93																										3.12	
	
2011									743.7																				643																										2.42																										2.44	
	
2012									843.6																				655																										2.89																										1.58										
	
2013									943.5																				659																											1.65																										2.15	
	
2014									993.9																				672																											0.70																										0.79	
	
2015								1249.1																		690																												0.69																									0.74	
	
2016								1199.2																		708																												0.98																									0.44	
	
2017								1284.2																		738																												1.25																									0.46							
	
2018								1329.8																		774																												1.96																									0.41	
	
2019								1428.3																																																						2.8	(August)							-0.59	(August	15)	
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1.1	Interpretation	of	the	data	
	
Above	statistics	show	that	the	AUM	of	the	combined	Dutch	pension	sector	have	
grown	much	more	rapidly	than	the	GDP	levels;	to	be	precise	the	AUM	practically	
doubled	between	2007	and	2018.	The	Dutch	GDP	grew	by	26.3%	over	the	same	
period.	
	
Another	factor	to	be	taken	into	account	is	the	increases	in	the	level	of	the	Dutch	
population,	which	 currently	 stands	at	17.106.426	 individuals	on	29	September	
2019.	In	1992	the	population	growth	rate	reached	an	annual	level	of	0.67%.	Ever	
since	1992,	 the	 annual	 growth	 rate	has	 steadily	 declined.	 It	was	0.4%	 in	2007	
and	0.22%	 in	2018.	Linked	with	 the	slowing	growth	 in	population,	 the	median	
age	is	going	up.	In	2005	the	median	age	was	39	and	by	2020	it	is	expected	to	be	
43.3	years.		
	
This	 paper	 will	 not	 discuss	 average	 life	 expectancy	 levels	 as	 this	 a	 job	 for	
professional	actuaries.	
	
1.2	The	links	between	inflation	levels	and	the	yield	on	Dutch	Treasuries	
	
2019	 is	 a	 historic	 year	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 yield	 on	Dutch	 government	 bonds.	 The	
OECD	statistics2	about	the	yield	over	the	10-year	Dutch	government	bonds	show	
that	since	1960,	such	yields	have	never	been	in	negative	territory	except	in	2019.	
	
It	is	not	that	inflation	levels	are	slowing	down,	rather	the	opposite,	but	yields	on	
10-year	Dutch	government	bonds	have	fallen	below	0	%.  
 
It	may	be	interesting	to	quote	a	17th	century	Dutch	experience3:		
“The	positive	 side	 of	 a	well-managed	public	 debt,	 like	 the	Dutch	 one,	 is	 that	 it	
expands	 the	purchasing	power	of	 the	state	 in	a	 timely	 fashion,	without	putting	
undue	burdens	on	the	tax	payer.	However,	there	are	prices	to	pay.	One	of	those	
prices	is	an	appreciable	redistributive	effect,	when	via	the	debt	service	money	is	
channelled	from	a	large	proportion	of	the	population	(the	tax	payers)	to	a	much	
smaller	 number	 of	 bondholders.	In	 the	 beginning	 (thanks	 also	 to	 the	 forced	
character	of	the	lending)	this	effect	was	limited	by	the	broad	distribution	of	debt-
holders	 across	 the	 population.	 In	 the	 course	 of	 the	 17th	 century,	 however,	
bondholding	 became	more	 concentrated.	 One	 of	 the	 reasons	 for	 this	 was	 that	
new	bonds	were	often	financed	by	reinvesting	retained	interest	by	existing		
																																																								
2	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IRLTLT01NLM156N:	source	OECD,	
Economic	Indicators	
	
3	
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_history_of_the_Dutch_Republic#Public_
finance	
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bondholders.	This	effect	increased	commensurately	with	the	increase	of	the	debt	
and	the	debt	service.	It	was	reinforced	by	the	fact	that	bondholders	were	thrifty	
people.	
	
In	 the	 course	 of	 the	 final	 third	 of	 the	 17th	 century,	 and	 especially	 of	 the	 18th	
century,	this	concentration	of	the	public	debt	in	the	hands	of	a	few	gave	rise	to	
the	 emergence	 of	 a	rentier	class	that	 amassed	 an	 important	 proportion	 of	 total	
wealth	in	the	Republic,	thanks	to	this	redistributive	effect,	and	despite	the	often	
confiscatory	 levies	 on	 wealth	 of	 the	 18th	 century	 described	 above.	 This	
development	went	hand	 in	hand	with	the	development	of	 the	public	debt	 itself	
after	1672.	During	the	second	half	of	the	Golden	Age	(especially	the	years	1650–
1665)	the	borrowing	requirements	of	commerce	and	the	public	sector	fell	short	
of	 the	 amount	 of	 savings	 supplied	 by	 the	 private	 sector.	 This	may	 explain	 the	
boom	in	real	estate	of	those	years	that	sometimes	acquired	a	"bubble"	character.	
However,	 after	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	Franco-Dutch	 War	of	 1672	 these	 savings	
were	 rechanneled	 to	 the	 public	 sector	 (explaining	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 housing	
bubble	 at	 the	 same	 time).	 Nevertheless,	 the	 holders	 of	 this	 rapidly	 increasing	
public	debt	were	still	awash	in	cash,	which	explains	the	low	interest	rates	in	the	
years	 up	 to	 1689.	 This	 availability	 of	 funds	 also	 helped	 finance	 the	 great	
expansion	of	the	VOC-	the	Dutch	East	Indies	Company-	(and	of	its	debt)	in	these	
years.”	
Returning	to	current	days,	the	class	of	a	small	group	of	17th	century	rentiers	has	
been	 replaced	 by	 large	 pension	 fund	 organisations,	 representing	 many,	 many	
individuals	 who	 are	 saving	 or	 have	 saved	 for	 a	 pension	 pay	 out.	 Nearly	 all	 of	
these	savers	rely	on	such	current	or	 future	 income	to	enjoy	a	 financially	stable	
retirement	period.	
The	 current	negative	yields	on	Dutch	 (and	German)	government	bonds	 -a	 first	
for	 at	 least	 the	 last	 60	 years4-	 can	 be	 compared	 to	 a	 tax	 on	 savings.	 Investors	
receive	less	money	back	than	they	put	into	the	bond	issue	in.	It	is	not	a	tax	on	the	
rich	in	society,	which	would	be	redistribution	type	of	tax.		It	is	a	tax	on	ordinary	
people,	who	 have	 put	 and	more	 importantly	were	 encouraged	 by	 government	
rules	to	put	their	trust	in	pension	funds	as	the	collective	vehicles	to	manage	their	
savings.	
This	same	government	–especially	in	the	views	of	the	Pension	Regulator-	claims	
that	paying	more	tax	on	savings	should	have	been	 foreseen	well	over	a	decade	
ago.	 	 Pension	 funds	 should	 have	 taken	 steps	 to	 prevent	 the	 effects	 of	 such	 tax	
payments.	The	same	Regulator	now	recommends	substantial	discounts	on	future	
pay-outs.	
	
																																																								
4	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IRLTLT01NLM156N:	source	OECD,	
Economic	Indicators	
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The	effect	 of	 the	 current	high	 inflation	 levels,	 high	under	Dutch	 standards	at	 a	
level	 of	 2.8%,	 will	 bring	 in	 higher	 tax	 receipts.	 Higher	 salaries	 and	 higher	
employment	levels	as	well	as	higher	price	levels	for	most	goods	and	services	will	
see	the	tax	intake	go	up.	
Perhaps	the	time	has	come	to	consider	measures	that	can	help	the	Dutch	pension	
funds	to	cope	with	negative	interest	rates	and	the	lack	of	alternatives	to	holding	
a	substantial	share	of	their	portfolios	in	Dutch	bank	bonds.	
	
	
2.	An	alternative	option	
	
Early	in	May	this	year,	the	Dutch	Minister	for	Social	Affairs	and	Employment,	Mr	
Koolmees,	wrote	 a	 letter	 to	 the	Dutch	Parliament	 about	 the	 agreed	 changes	 to	
the	Dutch	Pension	Contract.	Employer	federations,	trade	unions	and	government	
representatives	 all	 accepted	 these	 changes.	 In	 an	 English	 summary	 in	 an	 IPE	
article	most	of	these	changes5	are	described..	
However	 a	 major	 stumbling	 block	 was	 not	 dealt	 with	 in	 the	 Minister’s	 letter:	
“What	 to	do	about	 the	negative	 interest	rates	on	Dutch	government	bonds	and	
what	are	the	implications	for	pension	funds	in	their	valuation	of	assets.”	
Opinions	differ,	but	making	a	choice	becomes	easier	if	one	considers	that	a	tax	on	
savings	reflects	a	 transfer	of	 income	 from	the	bondholders	 to	 the	state.	 If	 such	
savers	are	savers	 in	pension	 funds,	who	can	 -as	yet-	not	withdraw	any	of	 their	
funds	 from	 these	 pension	 funds,	 then	 the	 only	 reasonable	 option	 is	 that	 the	
government	reimburses	the	pension	funds	for	a	loss	of	earnings.	If,	at	the	same	
time,	CPI	 inflation	levels	are	running	above	2%,	then	the	increased	tax	receipts	
out	of	incomes	allow	for	an	additional	compensation	level	for	pension	funds.	
The	main	rationale	for	setting	up	a	system	to	compensate	pension	funds	for	loss	
of	earnings	is	that	high	inflation	levels	(above	2%	per	annum)	and	interest	rates	
on	 government	 bonds	 below	 O%	 are	 economic	 distortions	 caused	 by	
government	policies	(including	ECB	decisions).	As	this	matter	involves	a	special	
allocation	 of	 tax	 receipts,	 such	 allocation	 needs	 the	 support	 of	 The	 Houses	 of	
Parliament	in	the	Netherlands.	It	is	customary	to	obtain	the	advice	of	the	Social	
Economic	Council	(SER)	before	the	matter	is	raised	in	Parliament.	
	
	
	
																																																								
5	https://www.ipe.com/countries/netherlands/dutch-social-partners-and-
government-reach-agreement-on-retirement-age/	
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3.	A	logical	conclusion	
A	tax	on	collective	savings,	a	diminished	availability	of	bank	bonds	to	the	extent	
of		€125	billion,	an	increased	negative	deposit	rate	for	surplus	bank	funds		(from	
-0.4%	 to	 -0.5%),	 and	 a	 sharp	 drop	 in	 share	 prices	 all	 point	 to	 the	 need	 for	
government	action.	
From	a	macro-economic	point	of	view,	a	 fiscal	 injection	into	the	pension	sector	
could	be	the	remedy	to	keep	up	demand	levels	at	a	time	of	economic	uncertainty.	
	
Three	steps	could	be	made	in	the	following	order:	
	
Step	1:	The	macro	approach	
The	Dutch	government	could	on	 the	advice	of	 the	Social	and	Economic	Council	
(SER)	 make	 a	 proposal	 to	 parliament	 to	 set	 aside	 an	 amount	 to	 achieve	 the	
macro-economic	 objective	 of	 retaining	 a	 stable	 pension	 sector.	 Each	 year	 the	
amount	could	be	reconsidered.	
	
Step	2:	The	micro	approach	
The	Pension	Regulator	could	set	up	and	Chair	a	Steering	Committee	made	up	of	
representatives	of	the	various	groups	of	pension	funds	(Company,	Industry	and	
Civil	Servants)	to	decide	how	to	distribute	the	government	allocation	to	pension	
funds.	
	
Step	3:	The	macro	and	micro	approach	combined	
It	could	be	suggested	that	a	special	purpose	vehicle	might	be	created:	A	National	
Pension	Bank	(NPB).	The	NPB	could		be	set	up	for	the	purpose	of	facilitating	the	
transfer	of	funds	between	the	government	and	the	pension	funds.	Owners	would	
be	 all	 pension	 funds	 pro	 rata	 their	 Assets	 under	 Management,	 The	 Chairman	
could	be	a	Representative	of	the	Regulator.	The	NPB	could	issue	0%	bonds	to	the	
sole	buyer:	the	Dutch	government.	The	advantage	is	that	as	soon	as	Parliament	
agrees	to	a	certain	amount	then	such	amount	is	already	available	with	the	NPB.	
Furthermore	 the	 distribution	 ratio	 could	 already	 have	 been	 agreed	 by	 the	
Steering	 Committee.	 Only	 after	 all	 those	 agreements	 have	 been	 made,	 the	
Government	could	take	the	tax	provision	for	the	allocation	to	pension	funds.	
	
	
Drs	Kees	De	Koning	
Chorleywood,	U.K.	
3	October	2019	
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